Kalpa

Kalpa is one of the six disciplines of Vedanga, treating ritual.

Tradition does not single out any special work in this branch of the Vedanga; but sacrificial practice gave rise to a large number of systematic sutrasfor the several classes of priests. A number of these works have come down to us, and they occupy by far the most prominent place among the literary productions of the sūtra-period. The Kalpa-sūtras, or rules of ceremonial, are of two kinds:  the Śrautasūtras, which are based on the shruti, and teach the performance of the great sacrifices, requiring three or five sacrificial fires; and   the Smartasūtras, or rules based on the smrti or tradition. The latter class again includes two kinds of treatises:   the Grhyasutras, or domestic rules, treating the rites of passage, such as marriage, birth, namegiving, etc., connected with simple offerings into the domestic fire; and   the Dharmasutras, which treat customs and social duties, and have formed the chief sources of the later law-books. Further, the Śrauta-sūtras of the Yajurveda have usually include a set of so-called Shulva-sutras, i.e. rules of the cord, which treat of the measurement by means of cords, and the construction, of different kinds of altars required for sacrifices. These treatises are of special interest as supplying important information regarding the earliest geometrical operations in India. Along with the Sutras may be classed a large number of supplementary treatises, usually called Pariśiṣṭa (परिशिष्ट), on various subjects connected with the sacred texts and Vedic religion generally.

Śrauta Sutras
The Śrautasutras (śrautasūtra) form a part of the corpus of Sanskrit Sutra literature. Their topic are the instructions relating to the use of the shruti corpus in ritual ('kalpa') and the correct performance of rituals as such. Some early Shrautasutras were composed in the late Brahmana period (such as the Baudhyanana and Vadhula Sutras), but the bulk of the Shrautasutras are roughly contemporary to the Grhya corpus of domestic Sutras, their language being late Vedic Sanskrit, dating to the middle of the first millennium BCE, generally predating Panini). 

Veda	Śrautasûtra
R̥gveda	Āśvalāyana Śrautasûtra Sāṅkhāyana Śrautasûtra
Sāmaveda	Lātyāyana Śrautasûtra Drāhyāyana Śrautasûtra Jaiminiya Śrautasûtra
Kr̥sna Yajurveda	Baudhāyana Śrautasûtra Vādhūla Śrautasûtra Mānava Śrautasûtra Bharadvāja Śrautasûtra Āpastamba Śrautasûtra Hiraṅyakeśi Śrautasûtra Vārāha Śrautasûtra Vaikhānasa Śrautasûtra
Śukla Yajurveda	Kātyāyana Śrautasûtra
Atharvaveda	Vaitāna Śrautasûtra

Grhya Sutras

The Grhya Sutras "domestic sutras" are a category of Sanskrit texts prescribing Vedic ritual, mainly relating to rites of passage. Their language is late Vedic Sanskrit, and they date to around roughly 500 BCE, contemporary with the Shrautasutras. They are named after Vedic shakhas.

Veda	Gr̥hyasûtra
R̥gveda	Âśvalâyana-Grhyasûtra Kausîtaki-Grhyasûtra Śāṅkhāyana-Gr̥hyasūtra
Sâmaveda	Gobhila-Grhyasûtra Khâdira-Grhyasûtra (Drâhyâyana-Grhyasûtra) Jaiminiya-Grhyasûtra Kauthuma-Grhyasûtra
Kr̥sna Yajurveda	Baudhâyana-Grhyasûtra Hiraṇyakeśi-Grhyasūtra (Satyâsâdha-Grhyasûtra)  Mânava-Grhyasûtra Bhâradvâja-Grhyasûtra Âpastamba-Grhyasûtra Âgniveśya-Grhyasûtra Vaikhânasa-Grhyasûtra Kâthaka-Grhyasûtra (Laugâksi-Grhyasûtra) Vârâha-Grhyasûtra Vâdhûla-Grhyasûtra Kapisthala-Katha Grhyasûtra (unpublished)
Śukla Yajurveda	Pâraskara-Grhyasûtra Katyayana-Grhyasûtra
Atharvaveda	Kauśika Grhyasûtra

Dharma Sutras

The Dharmasutras are Sanskrit texts dealing with custom, rituals and law. They include the four surviving written works of the ancient Indian tradition on the subject of dharma, or the rules of behavior recognized by a community. Unlike the later Dharmashastra, the dharmasutras are composed in prose. The oldest Dharmasutra is generally believed to have been that of Apastamba, followed by the dharmasutras of Gautama, Baudhayana, and an early version of Vasishtha. It is difficult to determine exact dates for these texts, but the dates between 500–300 BCE have been suggested for the oldest Dharmasutras. Later Dharmasutras include those of Kasyapa, Brhaspati, and Ushanas.

Veda	Dharmasûtra
R̥gveda	Vasishtha Dharmasûtra
Sāmaveda	Gautama Dharmasûtra
Kr̥sna Yajurveda	Baudhāyana Dharmasûtra Āpastamba Dharmasûtra
Śukla Yajurveda	Vishnu Dharmasûtra

Shulba Sutras

The Śulbasûtra that deal with laying out the offering ground and altar geometry are part of the Shrauta Sutras.

Veda	Śulbasûtra
Kr̥sna Yajurveda	Baudhāyana Śulbasûtra Mānava Śulbasûtra Āpastamba Śulbasûtra
Śukla Yajurveda	Kātyāyana Śulbasûtra

Cārvāka

Cārvāka (Sanskrit: चार्वाक), also known as Lokāyata, is a system of Indian philosophy that assumes various forms of philosophical skepticism and religious indifference. Etymologically, both words Cārvāka and Lokāyata imply popularity in Sanskrit. 
Cārvāka is classified as a heterodox Hindu (Nāstika) system.  It is characterized as a materialistic and atheistic school of thought. While this branch of Indian philosophy is today not considered to be part of the six orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy, some describe it as an atheistic or materialistic philosophical movement within Hinduism. 
Cārvāka emerged as an alternative to the orthodox Hindu pro-Vedic Āstika schools, as well as a philosophical predecessor to subsequent or contemporaneous nāstika philosophies such as Ājīvika, Jainism and Buddhism (the latter two later spinning off into what may be described today as separate religions) in the classical period of Indian philosophy.  As opposed to other schools, the first principle of Cārvāka philosophy was the rejection of inference as a means to establish metaphysical truths. 

 Name

Etymologically, Cārvāka means "agreeable speech" (cāru – agreeable and vāk – speech) and Lokāyata signifies "prevalence in the world" (loka – world and āyata – prevalent). 
The name Lokāyata can be traced to Kautilya's Arthashastra, which refers to three ānvīkṣikīs (logical philosophies) — Yoga, Samkhya and Lokāyata. However, Lokāyata in Arthashastra, does not stand for materialism because the Arthashastra refers to Lokāyata as a part of Vedic lore. Lokāyata here probably refers to logic or science of debate (disputatio, "criticism") and not to the materialist doctrine. Similarly, Saddaniti and Buddhaghosa in the 5th century connect the "Lokāyata" with the Vitandas (sophists).
It is only from about the 6th century that the term Lokāyata was restricted to the school of the materialists or Lokyātikas. The name Cārvāka was first used in the 7th century by the philosopher Purandara, who referred to his fellow materialists as "the Cārvākas", and it was used by the 8th century philosophers Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra. Adi Shankara, on the other hand, always used Lokāyata, not Cārvāka.  By the 8th century, the terms Cārvāka, Lokāyata, and Bārhaspatya were used interchangeably to signify materialism. 

 Origin

The earliest documented materialist in India is Ajita Kesakambali, a senior contemporary of the Buddha (sixth/fifth century BCE).  The basic tenets of Cārvāka philosophy, of no soul and existence of four (not five) elements were probably inspired from him. Although materialist schools existed before Cārvāka, it was the only school which systematized materialist philosophy by setting them down in the form of aphorisms in the 6th century. There was a base text, a collection sūtras or aphorisms and several commentaries were written to explicate the aphorisms 
E. W. Hopkins, in his The Ethics of India (1924) claims that Cārvāka philosophy was contemporaneous to Jainism and Buddhism, mentioning "the old Cārvāka or materialist of the 6th century BC". Rhys Davids assumes that lokāyata in ca. 500 BC came to mean "skepticism" in general without yet being organized as a philosophical school, and that the name of a villain in the epic Mahabharata, Cārvāka, was attached to the position in order to disparage it. The earliest positive statement of skepticism is preserved from the epic period, in the Ramayana, Ayodhya kanda, chapter 108, where Jabāli tries to persuade Rāma to accept the kingdom by using nāstika arguments (but Rāma then refutes him in chapter 109): 

O, the highly wise! Arrive at a conclusion, therefore, that there is nothing beyond this Universe. Give precedence to that which meets the eye and turn your back on what is beyond our knowledge. (2.108.17)

The Cārvāka school thus appears to have gradually grown out of generic skepticism in the Mauryan period, but its existence as an organized body cannot be ascertained for times predating the 6th century. The Barhaspatya sutras were likely also composed in Mauryan times, predating 150 BC, based on a reference in the Mahabhasya of Patanjali(7.3.45).  Cārvāka was a living philosophy up to the 12th century AD after which this system seems to have disappeared without leaving any trace. The reason for this sudden disappearance is not known. 

 Earliest descriptions

Brihaspati is sometimes referred to as the founder of Cārvāka or Lokāyata philosophy. The earliest direct quote from Brihaspati's lost writings is found in the textSarvasiddhantasamgraha, which is sometimes controversially attributed to Shankara. In the Sarvasiddhantasamgraha, the author quotes Brihaspati as follows:

“

Chastity and other such ordinances are laid down by clever weaklings; gifts of gold and land, the pleasure of invitations to dinner, are devised by indigent people with stomachs lean with hunger. The building of temples, houses for water-supply, tanks, wells, resting places, and the like, please only travelers, not others. The Agnihotra ritual, the three Vedas, the triple staff, the ash-smearing, are the ways of gaining a livelihood for those who are lacking in intellect and energy. The wise should enjoy the pleasures of this world through the more appropriate available means of agriculture, tending cattle, trade, political administration, etc.

”

The Cārvāka school of philosophy had a variety of atheistic and materialistic beliefs. They held perception to be the only valid source of knowledge. 

 Epistemology

In syllogism, the middle term, which is found in both the subject (minor term) and is invariably connected with the predicate (major term), is seen as the cause of knowledge. This invariable connection between middle term and predicate is unconditional and causes inference not by virtue of its existence, like the existence of the eye is the cause of perception, but by virtue of it being known. To the Cārvākas there were no reliable means by which this connection could be known and therefore the efficacy of inference as a means of knowledge could not be established.
To prove that inference was not a reliable means of knowledge Cārvākas examined and refuted each of the various means of knowing the connection between the middle term and the predicate individually:

• External perception, or perception which involves the use of the senses, could not be the required means because although, it is possible that the actual contact of the senses and the object could produce the knowledge of the particular object, yet there can never be such contact in the case of the past or the future. Therefore if external perception were the means on knowing the connection then inference related to objects of the past and future could not happen.

• Internal perception, or perception which involves the mind could, not be the required means either, because one cannot establish that the mind has any power to act independently towards an external object and is thought to be dependent on the external senses.

• Nor could inference be the means, since if inference were the proof of inference, one would also require another inference to establish this inference, and so on, leading to the fallacy of an Ad infinitum regression.

• Nor could testimony be the means, since testimony can be classified as a type of inference. Moreover, there is no reason for one to believe word of another. Besides, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the knowledge of the invariable connection between middle term and predicate, then in the case of a man to whom the fact of the connection had not been pointed out by another person, there could be no inference.

• Comparison (Upamana) could also be rejected as the means of the knowledge of the connection, since objective of using Upamana is to establish a different kind of knowledge than is being sought here, the relation of a name to something so named.

• Absence of a condition (Upadhi), which is given as the definition of an invariable connection to restrict too general a middle term, could itself not be used to establish inference because it is impossible to establish that all conditions required to restrict the middle term are known without recourse to inference and inference, as has been proven earlier, cannot establish itself.

 Metaphysics

Since, none of the means of knowing were found to be worthy to establish the invariable connection between middle term and predicate, Cārvākas concluded that the inference could not be used to ascertain metaphysical truths. Thus, to Cārvākas, the step which the mind takes from the knowledge of something to infer the knowledge of something else, could be accounted for by the its being based on a former perception or by its being in error. Cases where inference was justified by the result, were seen only to be mere coincidences.
Therefore, Cārvākas denied metaphysical concepts like reincarnation, extracorporeal soul, efficacy of religious rites, other world (heaven and hell), fate and accumulation ofmerit or demerit through the performance of certain actions. Cārvākas also rejected the use of supernatural causes to describe natural phenomena. To them all natural phenomena was produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.

The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;
By whom came this variety ? from their own nature was it born.

 Consciousness and Afterlife

Carvakas thought that body was formed out of four elements (not five) and that consciousness was an outcome of the mixture of these elements. Therefore, Carvakas did not believe in an afterlife. To them, all attributes that represented a person, such a thinness, fatness etc., resided in the body. To support the proposition of non-existence of anysoul or consciousness in the afterlife Carvakas often quoted from Brihadaranyaka Upanishad.

Springing forth from these elements itself
solid knowledge is destroyed
when they are destroyed—
after death no intelligence remains.

 Pleasure

The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains,Cārvāka believed that there was nothing wrong with sensual pleasure. Since it is impossible to have pleasure without pain, Cārvāka thought that wisdom lay in enjoying pleasure and avoiding pain as far as possible. Unlike many of the Indian philosophies of the time, Cārvāka did not believe in austerities or rejecting pleasure out of fear of pain and held such reasoning to be foolish.

What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because covered with husk and dust?

 Religion

Cārvākas rejected religious conceptions like afterlife, reincarnation, religious rites etc. They were extremely critical of the Vedas and thought that Vedas suffered from three faults - untruth, self-contradiction and tautology. To them, Vedas were just incoherent rhapsodies. They also held the belief that such texts were invented and made up by men and had no divine authority.

The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing one's self with ashes,
Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness.

 Criticism

Buddhist philosophers reasoned that the Cārvāka proposition, that inference could not be used as a form of evidence (Pramana), was absurd. If no arguments were given to prove this proposition, it would just be a bare assertion. Whereas, if some form of argumentation were given, it would result in absurdity, because inference was being used to disprove its own efficacy as evidence. Besides, when existence of any object, be it the authority of inference, was denied on the ground of its not being perceived, inference was itself admitted in proposing such an argument, with middle term being the non-perception.

 Works

No independent works on Cārvāka philosophy can be found except for a few sūtras composed by Brihaspati. The 8th century Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarashi Bhatta(ca. 8th century) is often cited as the only extant authentic Cārvāka text, but which also shows Madhyamaka influence. Shatdarshan Samuchay andSarvadarśanasaṅ̇graha of Vidyaranya are a few other works which elucidate Cārvāka thought.
One of the most important references to the Cārvāka philosophy is the Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha (etymologically all-philosophy-collection), a famous work of 14th centuryAdvaita Vedanta philosopher Mādhava Vidyāraṇya from South India, which starts with a chapter on the Cārvāka system. After invoking, in the Prologue of the book, the Hindu gods Shiva and Vishnu ("by whom the earth and rest were produced"), Vidyāraṇya asks, in the first chapter:

“

...but how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Charvaka, the crest-gem of the atheistic school, the follower of the doctrine of Brihaspati? The efforts of Charvaka are indeed hard to be eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current refrain: While life is yours, live joyously; None can escape Death's searching eye: When once this frame of ours they burn, How shall it e'er again return?

”

Ain-i-Akbari, written by Abul Fazl, the famous historian of Akbar's court, mentions a symposium of philosophers of all faiths held in 1578 at Akbar's insistence. Some of the beliefs of Cārvāka are recorded from this symposium, in which, some Cārvāka philosophers are said to have participated.
Sanskrit poems and plays like the Naiṣadha-carita, Prabodha-candrodaya, Āgama-dambara, Vidvanmoda-taraṅgiṇī and Kādambarī contain representations of the Cārvāka thought. However, the authors of these works were thoroughly opposed to materialism and tried to portray the Cārvāka in unfavourable light. Therefore, their works should only be accepted critically.

 Loss of original works

There was no continuity in the Cārvāka tradition after the 12th century. Whatever is written on Cārvāka post this is based on second-hand knowledge, learned from preceptors to disciples and no independent works on Cārvāka philosophy can be found.Chatterjee and Datta explain that our understanding of Cārvāka philosophy is fragmentary, based largely on criticism of its ideas by other schools, and that it is not a living tradition:

"Though materialism in some form or other has always been present in India, and occasional references are found in the Vedas, the Buddhistic literature, the Epics, as well as in the later philosophical works we do not find any systematic work on materialism, nor any organised school of followers as the other philosophical schools possess. But almost every work of the other schools states, for refutation, the materialistic views. Our knowledge of Indian materialism is chiefly based on these."

 Representation of Cārvāka in Āstika, Buddhist and Jain Literature

The Yogācāra Buddhists, Jains, Advaita Vedantins and Nyāya philosophers considered the Cārvākas as one of their opponents and tried to refute their views. These refutations are sources of Cārvāka philosophy since, they continued to be made even after all the authentic Cārvāka/Lokāyata texts had been lost. However, the representation of the Cārvāka thought in these works is not always firmly grounded in first hand knowledge of Cārvāka texts and should be viewed critically.
Though Cārvākas accepted direct perception as the surest method to prove the truth of anything, they might also have accepted a limited usage of inference. The perception that Cārvākas had a rigid stance against the application of inference might have been a result of caricaturing of their arguments by their opponents. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya quotes S. N. Dasgupta:

"Purandara (a Lokāyata philosopher)  admits the usefulness of inference in determining the nature of all worldly things where perceptual experience is available; but inference cannot be employed for establishing any dogma regarding the transcendental world, or life after death or the law of karma which cannot be available to ordinary perceptual experience."

Likewise, the charge of hedonism against Cārvāka might have been exaggerated. Countering the argument that the Cārvākas opposed all that was good in the Vedic tradition, Dale Riepe says, "It may be said from the available material that Cārvākas hold truth, integrity, consistency, and freedom of thought in the highest esteem."

Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā (मीमांसा), a Sanskrit word meaning "investigation"  , is the name of an orthodox (Sanskrit: astika) school of Hindu philosophy whose primary enquiry is into the nature of dharma based on close hermeneutics of the Vedas. The nature of dharma is not accessible to reason or observation, and must be inferred from the authority of the revelation contained in the Vedas, which are considered eternal, authorless (apauruṣeyatva), and infallible.  The school of Mimamsa consists of both atheistic and theistic doctrines and is not deeply interested in the existence of God, but rather in the character of dharma. 

Mīmāṃsā is strongly concerned with textual exegesis, and consequently gave rise to the study of philology and the philosophy of language. Its notion of "speech" (Skt. śabda) as indivisible unity of sound and meaning (signifier and signified) is due to Bhartṛhari (ca. 5th century CE). 

Terminology

Mīmāṃsā is also known as Pūrva Mīmāṃsā ("prior" inquiry, also Karma-Mīmāṃsā), in contrast to Uttara Mīmāṃsā ("posterior" inquiry, also Brahma-Mīmāṃsā) is the opposing school ofVedanta. This division is based on the notion of a dichotomy of the Vedic texts into a karmakāṇḍa, the department of the Veda treating of sacrificial rites (Samhitas and Brahmanas), and thejñānakāṇḍa dealing with the knowledge of Brahman (the Upanishads).

Tenets

The core tenets of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā are ritualism (orthopraxy), anti-asceticism and anti-mysticism. The central aim of the school is elucidation of the nature of dharma, understood as a set ritual obligations and prerogatives to be performed properly.

Epistemology

In the field of epistemology, later Mimāṃsākas made some notable contributions. Unlike the Nyaya or the Vaisheshika systems, the Prābhākara school recognizes five means of valid knowledge (Skt. pramāṇa) and the Bhāṭṭa school recognizes six. In addition to the four means of valid knowledge accepted by the Nyaya school (pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna and śabda), the Prābhākaraschool recognizes presumption (Skt. arthāpatti) and the Bhāṭṭa school recognizes both presumption and non-apprehension (anuapalabdhi) as additional valid means of knowledge. Another interesting feature of the Mimāṃsā school of philosophy is its unique epistemological theory of the intrinsic validity of all cognition as such. It is held that all knowledge is ipso facto true (Skt.sataḥprāmāṇyavāda). Thus, what is to be proven is not the truth of a cognition, but its falsity. The Mimāṃsākas advocate the self-validity of knowledge both in respect of its origin (utpatti) and ascertainment (jñapti). Not only did the Mimāṃsākas make the very great use of this theory to establish the unchallengeable validity of the Vedas, but later Vedantists also drew freely upon this particular Mimāṃsā contribution.

Dharma

Dharma as understood by Pūrva Mīmāṃsā can be loosely translated into English as "virtue", "morality" or "duty". The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā school traces the source of the knowledge of dharma neither to sense-experience nor inference, but to verbal cognition (i.e. knowledge of words and meanings) according to Vedas. In this respect it is related to the Nyāya school, the latter, however, allows fewer proofs (pramāṇa) than Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. 

The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā school held dharma to be equivalent to following the prescriptions of the Saṃhitās and their Brāhmaṇa commentaries relating the correct performance of Vedic rituals. Seen in this light, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is essentially ritualist (orthopraxy), placing great weight on the performance of karma or action as enjoined by the Vedas.

Atheism

Mīmāṃsā theorists decided that the evidence allegedly proving the existence of God was insufficient. They argue that there was no need to postulate a maker for the world, just as there was no need for an author to compose the Vedas or a God to validate the rituals.  Mīmāṃsā argues that the Gods named in the Vedas have no existence apart from the mantras that speak their names. To that regard, the power of the mantras is what is seen as the power of Gods. 

Relation to Vedānta

Emphasis of Yajnic Karmakāṇḍas in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is erroneously interpreted by some to be an opposition to Jñānakāṇḍa of Vedānta and Upaniṣads. Pūrva Mīmāṃsā does not discuss topics related to Jñānakāṇḍa, such as salvation (mokṣa), but it never speaks against mokṣa. Vedānta quotes Jaimini's belief in Brahman as well as in mokṣa:

In Vedānta (1.2.28), Bāḍarāyaṇa cites Jaimini as saying that "There is no contradiction in taking Vaishvānara as the supreme Brahman".

In 1.2.31, Jaimini is again quoted by Bāḍarāyana as saying that the nirguna (attribute-less) Brahman can manifest itself as having a form.

In 4.3.12, Bādarāyana again cites Jaimini as saying that the mukta Purusha attains Brahman.

In Pūrva Mīmāṃsā too, Jaimini emphasises the importance of faith in and attachment to the Omnipotent Supreme Being Whom Jaimini calls "The Omnipotent Pradhaana" (The Main):

Pūrva Mīmāṃsā 6.3.1: "sarvaśaktau pravṛttiḥ syāt tathābhūtopadeśāt" (सर्वशक्तौ प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् तथाभूतोपदेशात्). The term upadeśa here means instructions of the śāstras as taught. We should tend towards the omnipotent supreme being. In the context of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā 6.3.1 shown above, next two sutras becomes significant, in which this Omnipotent Being is termed as "pradhāna", and keeping away from Him is said to be a "doṣa", hence all beings are asked to get related ("abhisambandhāt" in tadakarmaṇi ca doṣas tasmāt tato viśeṣaḥ syāt pradhānenābhisambandhāt; Jaimini 6, 3.3) to the "Omnipotent Main Being" (api vāpy ekadeśe syāt pradhāne hy arthanirvṛttir guṇamātram itarat tadarthatvāt; Jaimini 6, 3.2). Karma-Mīmāṃsā supports the Vedas, and Rgveda says that one Truth is variously named by the sages. It is irrelevant whether we call Him as Pradhāna or Brahman or Vaishvānara or Shiva or God.

History

The school's origins lie in the scholarly traditions of the final centuries BCE, when the priestly ritualism of Vedic sacrifice was being marginalized by Buddhism and Vedanta. To counteract this challenge, several groups emerged dedicated to demonstrating the validity of the Vedic texts by rigid formulation of rules for their interpretation. The school gathers momentum in the Gupta periodwith Śābara, and reaches its apex in the 7th to 8th centuries with Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara.

The school for some time in the Early Middle Ages exerted near-dominant influence on learned Hindu thought, and is credited as a major force contributing to the decline of Buddhism in India, but it has fallen into decline in the High Middle Ages and today is all but eclipsed by Vedanta. 

Mimamsa texts

The foundational text for the Mīmāṃsā school is the Purva Mīmāṃsā Sutras of Jaimini (ca. 3rd to 1st century BCE). A major commentary was composed by Śābara in ca. the 5th or 6th century CE. The school reaches its height with Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara (fl. ca. 700 CE). Both Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhākara (along with Murāri, whose work is no more extant) have written extensive commentaries on Śābara's Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣyam. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Mandana Miśra, Pārthasārathi Miśra, Sucarita Miśra, Ramakrishna Bhatta, Madhava Subhodini, Sankara Bhatta, Krsnayajvan, Anantadeva, Gaga Bhatta, Ragavendra Tirtha, VijayIndhra Tirtha, Appayya Dikshitar, Paruthiyur Krishna Sastri, Mahomahapadyaya Sri Ramsubba Sastri, Sri Venkatsubba Sastri, Sri A. Chinnaswami Sastri, Sengalipuram Vaidhyanatha Dikshitar were some of the Mimamsa Scholars.

The Mīmāṁsā Sūtra of Jaimini (c. 3rd century BCE) has summed up the general rules of nyāya for Vedic interpretation. The text has 12 chapters, of which the first chapter is of philosophical value. The commentaries on the Mīmāṁsā Sūtra by Bhartṛmitra, Bhavadāsa, Hari and Upavarṣa are no more extant. Śabara (c. 1st century BCE) is the first commentator of the Mīmāṁsā Sūtra, whose work is available to us. His bhāṣya is the basis of all later works of Mīmāṁsā . Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (7th century CE), the founder of the first school of the Mīmāṁsā commented on both theSūtra and its Śabara Bhāṣya. His treatise consists of 3 parts, the Ślokavārttika, the Tantravārttika and the Ṭupṭīkā. Manḍana Miśra (8th century CE) was a follower of Kumārila, who wroteVidhiviveka and Mīmāṁsānukramaṇī. There are several commentaries on the works of Kumārila. Sucarita Miśra wrote a Kāśikā (commentary) on the Ślokavārttika. Someśvara Bhatta wroteNyāyasudhā, also known as Rāṇaka, a commentary on the Tantravārttika. Pārthasarathi Miśra wrote Nyāyaratnākara (1300 CE), another commentary on the Ślokavārttika. He also wroteŚāstradīpikā, an independent work on the Mīmāṁsā and Tantraratna. Venkaṭa Dīkṣita’s Vārttikabharaṇya is a commentary on the Ṭupṭīkā. Prabhākara (8th century CE), the originator of the second school of the Mīmāṁsā wrote his commentary Bṛhatī on the Śabara Bhāṣya. Śālikanātha’s Ṛjuvimalā (9th century CE) is a commentary on the Bṛhatī. His Prakaraṇapañcikā is an independent work of this school and the Pariśiṣṭa is a brief explanation of the Śabara Bhāṣya. Bhavanātha’s Nyāyaviveka deals with the views of this school in details. The founder of the third school of the Mīmāṁsā was Murāri, whose works have not reached us.

Āpadeva (17th century) wrote an elementary work on the Mīmāṁsā, known as Mīmāṁsānyāyaprakaśa or Āpadevī. Arthasaṁgraha of Laugākṣi Bhāskara is based on the Āpadevī. Vedānta Deśika’s Śeśvara Mīmāṁsā was an attempt to combine the views of the Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta schools.